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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
JUDGES OF THE FACTS*
CHARLES J. VOGEL*
First, I express to you members of Order of the Coif my very
sincere appreciation for the honor that is tonight being given to
me. I understand that I have, indeed, been invited into rarified
atmosphere and I am not much conlforted by the delusion that if
I had studied a great deal harder in law school I might just pos-
sibly have got here on my own.
This May 1st, 1958, has been proclaimed by the President to be
"Law Day U.S.A." so "* * * that (in the words of the President)
the people of this nation should remember with pride and vigilant-
ly guard the great heritage.of liberty, justice and equality under
law which our forefathers bequeathed to us". There could be
no more appropriate occasion than this first Law Day to bring to
mind, to discuss and to pay tribute to the great cornerstones in
the edifice of the law-the right to trial by jury. Blackstone said
long ago, "Trial by jury is the glory of the law." It is of this right
and of how jurors came to be judges of the facts, that I speak.
We judges of the law, protected by our bailiffs and deputies,
waited on by law clerks and secretaries, sitting in the sanctums of
our chambers or enveloped in the dignity of our black robes on
the bench, are sometimes prone to forget that in the administra-
tion of justice there are other judges, of equal importance, of equal
dignity, of equal intelligence and integrity, whose decisions deter-
mine questions of life, liberty and property and upon whose right
to do so rests a great part of the freedom we today enjoy. These
judges possess no tenure of office. They receive no adequate
salary. Actually their service, incurs financial loss. They are pluck-
ed willy-nily from their home environments. They are plunged
into a strange, new world, where they play tremendously import-
ant roles in the administration of justice. For most of them, the
experience is new. The surroundings are unfamiliar and the con-
versations strange. Yet I know of no more thrilling thing in the
processes making for self-government than the sight of twelve hon-
est, conscientious jurors bending their every effort to decide justly
between men and men, and between men and their government.
In man's age-old struggle for freedom there is no more important
right than that to trial by jury. Trial by jury, together with the
" Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
*Address given at the initiation for Order of the Coil, May 1, 1958, in Grand Forks,
North Dakota.
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writ of habeas corpus, representative government and freedom of
speech are considered so vital as guardians of liberty and freedom
that the loss of any one would destroy our existence as a free
people.
The right to trial by jury was not won in a short, quick struggle
and then recorded on the books for the protection of mankind. It
evolved over centuries of time, finally culminating irx our modern
jury trials. The true roots of its beginning are probably buried in
the mists of the past, beyond reach o! historians or at least beyond
proof. There are, however, many theories as to how and where
the system originated. While the -ury in its presently developed
form is distinctly and exclusively of indigenous growth in England
after the Norman Conquest, it is, nevertheless, in its primitive
forms, of Anglo-Saxon and Continental origin.
The case of the grand jury is quite clear. An ordinance enacted
in the reign of Ethelred II in 981 A. D. provided, "And that a
gemot be held in every wapentake; and the XII senior thegns go
out, and the reeve with them, and swear on the relic which is given
them in hand, that they will accuse no innocent men nor conceal
any guilty one."
Like a grand jury of today, the function performed by the 12
thegns was merely to accuse. The guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused persons was then determined, either by compurgation or
trial by ordeal. Compurgation amounted to trial by character
witnesses. Trial by ordeal rested in the belief of divine interven-
tion to vindicate the just. The early Norman Kings did little to dis-
turb the system of county courts as established at the time of the
Conquest. It is probable, then, that this early jury of accusation,
or grand jury, continued in use until it was specifically recognized
by statute in the-reign of Henry II.
The case of the petit jury is not so clear. On it, many scholars
have speculated and great differences of opinion resulted. Some
writers maintain that the petit jury is wholly of English origin,
that it was not derived from any Continental institution. (Forsyth,
History of Trial by Jury, 1852, page 13.) Others maintain that it
was of Roman-British origin. The most widely accepted view, how-
ever, is that it derives from a system of investigation by sworn
inquests, imported into England by the Normans. Such students
of the subject as Stubbs, Pollock and Maitland, Palgrave, Brunner
and more recently Winston Churchill have all adopted this theory.
The system of sworn inquests, a possible adaptation of the fiscal
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regulations of the Theodosian Code, was established in France by
the Carolingian Kings more than a hundred years before the Con-
'quest. The Frank Capitularies provided detailed procedure and in-
.structions for such inquisitions. In France, and in its earliest use
:in England, the sworn inquest was not applied to judicial matters.
In France it was an administrative device to obtain information
and to define royal rights. Perhaps its first use in England was in
compiling the Domesday Survey, completed in 1086. This Survey
listed every tract of land in England, its owner and its value. It
was founded in large part upon agreed statements of groups of
citizens in each county who were .worn to state the truth. The
inquest also was used to assess taxes. From the reign of Henry
I to Edward I it was the usual machinery for that purpose.
The use of the jury, both as a means of accusing persons of
crime and of settling disputes in court, is first mentioned in the
statutes of England and recorded in i he Constitutions of Clarendon
,enacted by a Great Council held in 1164. Chapter 6 of the Consti-
tutions provides that laymen, be tried in the Bishop's Court only if
accused by lawful and specific accusers and witnesses. If no one
were willing, or dared, to appear as accuser against a powerful
delinquent, the sheriff, at the request of the Bishop, empaneled
and swore in 12 lawful men of the neighborhood to declare the
truth. Chapter 9 provided that in disputes between laymen and
cleric as to land which the cleric asserted to be held in frankal-
-inoign, the Chief Justice should decide by the recognition of twelve
lawful men whether it was held by eleemosynary tenure.
A statute, which was probably cnacted at a council held at
Windsor in 1179, provided that in the Grand Assize, in all actions
to try the title to land, the defendant might elect beween trial by
battle and trial by the recognition )f twelve sworn knights of the
neighborhood chosen by four other knights summoned for that
purpose by the sheriff. Trial by battle was a Norman importation
which the English detested. Henry II's contemporary, Glanville,
wrote that the people welcomed as a royal boon the statute which
relieved freeholders from this barbarous and uncertain method of
trial. About this time recognition by a jury of twelve knights or
freeholders of the neighborhood, chosen by the sheriff, was applied
to determining issues of fact arising in actions which dealt with
recent changes of seisin only and in which actual title to the land
was not involved.
Henry II, in order to strengthen and centralize power in the
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national government, saw to it that trials by jury were available
only in the King's Court and in the courts of his justices itinerant.
This limitation of jury use to. the King's Courts, and the popularity
of trial by, jury, caused a rapid decline in the influence of the
baronical and county courts. It also contributed much to the de-
velopment of uniformity of the common law throughout .the king-
dom.
The Constitutions of Clarendon d1irected that, in certain cases,
the principal of recognition by a jury should be used as a method
of charging persons with the commission of crime. Later this was
extended to all cases. By the Chapters of Eyre, issued in 1194
during the reign of Richard I, itinerant justices were given com-
plete instructions about how to empanel such juries. This system
became uniform throughout the country.
At this time the only methods of trying an accused were by
ordeal or by battle. Trial by compurgation had been abolished as
"the manifest fountain of unblushing perjury". Trial by battle was
available only in those cases where an individual accuser or "appel-
lant" came forward and demanded it. In most cases, therefore,
after a jury had presented its accusation the accused was subjected
to ordeal to determine his guilt or innocence. In 1215, however,
trial by ordeal was abolished throughout Christendom by the
Fourth Lateran Council. Thereafter, in cases where trial by battle
was inappropriate, no method remained to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused. English ingenuity, however,' adopted
the practice of submitting the question of guilt or innocence to a
second jury and the predecessor of 1he modern petit jury came into
being. This practice was in general use by the time Henry III.
Although persons accused of crime were not compelled to accept
this method of trial, extreme measures were taken to persuade
them to do so. If an accused refused to plead, he was remanded
to prison. There he might remain indefinitely, only to be punished
finally by being pressed to death by weights gradually put upon
him. This method was known as peine forte et dure. The, only
advantage in refusing to consent to trial was that without trial
there could be no conviction, therefore no attainder or corruption
of the blood. Thus, the accused's property was not confiscated and
his heirs could inherit.
The function performed by these early juries differed from that
of the modem jury. They still- were mere recognitors. Each took
an oath to found his verdict upon his own knowledge "as an eye
1958]
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witness or by the words of their fathers, or by such words as they
are bound to have as much confidence in, as if they were their
own." In case the first jury was ignorant of the facts, a new jury
was empanelled. If some of them were ignorant of the facts or the
jury disagreed, new members could be added until twelve mem-
bers were agreed. This was called "afforcing" the jury.
The change to modern practice came slowly. During the time of
Henry III special witnesses, such as witnesses to a deed, were
sometimes added to the jury. The year book of 23 Edward III
records that though witnesses were added to 4 jury to give their
testimony, they had no voice in the verdict. This practice intro-
duced a connecting link between the ancient and modern jury.
Late in the reign of Henry IV it was required that all evidence
be given in open court so that the judges might exclude whatever
was improper. That practice had two very important consequen-
ces: First, the law of evidence came into being; and, second, the
advocate became a necessary adjunct of the court. By 1470 the
procedure of witnesses testifying "viva voce" had become what it
is today. For a long time, however, juries were allowed to rely
on their own knowledge, as well as on the evidence., Not until
the reign of Queen Anne at the beginning of the 18th Century did
the Court of the Queen's Bench hold that if a jury gave a verdict
of their own knowledge, they ought to so inform the court and be
sworn as witnesses. A later case in the reign of George I clearly
declared for the modem practice that jurors reach a verdict on the
evidence received in court and upon that alone.
While jurors were still mere recognitors, they were subject to
punishment for bringing in a wrong verdict. The procedure was
by writ of attaint issued at the request of a defeated litigant. In
attaint, the issues of fact in the case were submitted to a second
jury of 24. If the second jury brought in a verdict opposed to that
of the first, members of the first jury were imprisoned, mad their
property forfeited to the king. After jurors became judges of the
facts in the modem sense, the writ of attaint gradually fell into dis-
use. Sir Thomas Smith in 1583 said., "Attaints be very seldom put
in use." In 1757 Lord Mansfield said, "The writ of attaint is now
a mere sound in every case." The procedure, however, was not
abolished by statute until the reign of George IV.
After the attaint was discontinued, the Tudor and Stuart sov-
ereigns, for political purposes, used the Court of the Star Chamber
to intimidate juries. Juries which brought in verdicts considered
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detrimental to the prerogatives of the crown were summoned be-
fore the Star Chamber, fined and imprisoned. After the Star
Chamber was abolished, the crown convinced the servile judges
of the time that they should take the matter into their own hands.
They then countenanced prosecutions of jurors in the common law
courts. This practice finally ended with Bushell's historic case in
1670, which vindicated the right -of jurors to return verdicts ac-
cording to their conscience. EdmunLd Bushell was foreman of the
jury which acquitted the Quakers, William Penn and William
Mead, of preaching to a large gathering of people: in Grace Church
Street in violation of the Conventicle Act (16 Car. 14, c. 4). In
the Court of the Recorder of London the entire jury was prose-
cuted and each fined 40 Marks (£26, 13s, 4d). Bushell refused
to pay the fine and was committed to prison. He petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Common Pleas. The return
to the writ stated that Bushell had been committed for finding a
verdict "against full and manifest evidence and against the direc-
tion of the court." Chief Justice Vaughan found the cause for im-
prisonment insufficient and discharged the prisoner. In this judg-
ment, the Chief Justice affirmed the right of the jury to find a
general verdict in criminal cases, that is, to determine not only the
facts in the case but their quality of guilt or innocence as well.'
With the adoption in 1689 of the English Bill of Rights entitled
"An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and
settling the Succession of the Crown," the judges, who in the past
had served only during the pleasuev of the king, were freed of
the crown's domination by provision that they should serve during
good behavior. Since that time there has been recorded no serious
attempt to encroach upon a jury as a free and independent arm of
the court.
Now our juries no longer may be questioned as to the correct-
ness of their decisions. They may not impeach ther own verdicts.
With certain exceptions, their deliberations in the jury room are in-
violate. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said,2 "Freedom of debate might
be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were
made to feel that their argument and ballots were to be freely
published to the world."
1. Penn and Mead's case, 6 Howell's State Trial 951; Bushell's case, Vaughan 135;
S. C. 6 Howell's State Trials 999; 1 Freeman 1; Jones, 13.
2. Clark v. United States, 1933, 289 U.S. 1, 12.
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* Today's juries are true descendents of man's desire and struggle
for freedom and the right to be judged by his fellowmen. So long
as our rights are determined by the balanced judgment of twelve
honest citizens we are safeguarded against arbitrary dictatorship.
Listen to the.words of Chief Justice Thomas M. Cooley in 1868:"
"'The trial of criminal cases is by a jury of the country, and not by
the court. The jurors, and they alone, are to judge of the facts, and
weigh the evidence. The law has established this tribunal because
it is believed that, from its numbers, the mode of their selection,
and the fact that the jurors come from all classes of society, they
are better calculated to judge of motives, weigh probabilities, and
take what may be called a common sense view of a set of circum-
stances, involving both act and intent, than any single man, how-
ever pure, wise and eminent he ma', be. This is the theory of the
law; and as applied to criminal accusations, it is eminently wise,
and favorable alike to liberty and to justice."
We have all watched these judges of the facts at work. Fr
more than thirteen years I watched them from the Federal trial
bench. Out of that close relationship there developed in me a deep
and an abiding respect for the men and women who sit on our
juries and in all solemnity and with high purpose judge of our
deeds and of our misdeeds. I treasure, more than anything, in my
experience in the law, the opportunities I have had to work with
my fellow citizens as they were called into the jury box to become
judges of the facts.
3. The People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 27.
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